Financial Restructuring & Bankruptcy Alert | March 2016
. . if . .
. such lease is of nonresidential real property and
has been terminated under applicable non-bankruptcy
law prior to the order for relief.” 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(3).
The Circuit Court remarked that the Bankruptcy Court’s
reliance on section 365(c)(3) put it “on a collision course”
with section 101(54)(D), which “covers not only property
but also an interest in property, and a lease is an interest
in property.”
“Section 365(c) is aimed at facilitating the re-leasing of
commercial property during bankruptcy proceedings by
forbidding the trustee to interfere with the occupancy of
the new tenants.” It prohibits the trustee from assuming
and assigning the leases to a different tenant.
But the
committee isn’t seeking the leases themselves, rather
to avoid them (under Bankruptcy Code sections 547 &
548) and to recover their value (under Bankruptcy Code
section 550). “Section 365(c)(3) is therefore inapplicable.”
After terminating the leases with the debtor, the
landlord leased the two stores to a different oil change
company. “If the bankruptcy court were to order the
stores turned over to Great Lakes’ creditors, this would
have the disruptive effect on commercial activity against
which section 365(c)(3) is aimed.
But to repeat, the
creditors are seeking not the leases but the value of the
leases that Great Lakes transferred to T.D. They are not
trying to evict anyone.”
The Seventh Circuit concluded by reiterating that
the “distinction between the value of the leases (value
to which the creditors may be entitled) and the leases
themselves (which cannot lawfully be transferred to
them) enables the purpose of section 365(c)(3) to be
fulfilled without making inroads into section 101(54)(D).
The bankruptcy judge’s reading of 365(c)(3) placed the
two sections in needless conflict.”
Notably, the Circuit Court did not discuss the significant
body of case law (cited in the Bankruptcy Court decision
(528 B.R. 893)) holding that the prepetition termination
of a lease is not an avoidable transfer.
Neither did the
Court mention section 8(e)(1) of the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act, specifically stating that a transfer is not
voidable if it results from the “termination of a lease upon
default by the debtor when the termination is pursuant to
the lease and applicable law.”
For more information on this alert, please contact
Audrey Noll at 310.693.4414 or anoll@foxrothschild.com
or any member of the firm’s Financial Restructuring &
Bankruptcy Department.
Attorney Advertisement
© 2016 Fox Rothschild LLP. All rights reserved. All content of this publication is the
property and copyright of Fox Rothschild LLP and may not be reproduced in any format without prior express
permission.
Contact marketing@foxrothschild.comfor more information or to seek permission to reproduce content.
This publication is intended for general information purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice. The reader should
consult with knowledgeable legal counsel to determine how applicable laws apply to specific facts and situations.
This
publication is based on the most current information at the time it was written. Since it is possible that the laws or other circumstances
may have changed since publication, please call us to discuss any action you may be considering as a result of reading this publication.
www.foxrothschild.com
.