under English law (s 170(5) of the CA
2006 providing that the director’s general
duties, as set out in ss 171-177 of the CA
2006, apply to shadow directors), lenders
potentially acting as shadow directors
will, like the sponsor’s directors, run the
risk of undertaking wrongful trading by
the business. In an English law context,
personal liability for wrongful trading
carries risk under s 214 of the IA 1986 in
circumstances where: (i) a company has
gone into insolvent liquidation or insolvent
administration; (ii) at some time before
the commencement of the winding up or
insolvent administration of the company,
a director at the time (including a de facto
director or shadow director) knew or
ought to have concluded that there was no
reasonable prospect that the company would
avoid going into insolvent liquidation/
administration; and (iii) that director (after
satisfying the condition in (ii)) failed to take
every step with a view to minimising the
potential loss to the company’s creditors.
Similar rights exist under many
potentially relevant jurisdictions, for
example, the Netherlands, Singapore, Brazil
and Australia and others. This is a risk that
has to be carefully considered especially
where the prolonged trading has eroded the
liquidity of the project company and it finds
itself unable to fund any safety or other decommissioning costs.
Although these risks are obviously by
no means unique to a natural resources
project, they may be increased by some of the
unique operational aspects of a business of
this kind. In addition to the usual essential
operating costs to keep the project going
(fuel and other input costs, salaries, local
taxes and royalties and similar), others
may at first appear more discretionary.
For
example, some of the costs related to social
and environmental initiatives noted above,
and perhaps local security measures, may in
reality be essential to maintain operations
(perhaps by helping to keep the required
licenses or concessions in good standing).
Policy lenders are also likely to insist that
expenses of this kind are met. Directors will
therefore need to balance the need to meet
crucial expenses as they fall due and their
Corporate Rescue and Insolvency
fiduciary duty to protect creditors’ interests.
If the directors cannot satisfy
themselves that there is no reasonable
prospect of avoiding an insolvent winding
up, on the basis that this is the stage where
the directors’ duty to act in the best
interests of the members of the company
switches to a duty to act in the best
interests of the creditors (s 170(3) of the
CA 2006 provides that the duty to act in
the best interests of the company is subject
to any rules which require the directors to
act in the interests of the creditors, such as
s 214 of the IA 1986 wrongful trading
provisions), then the implications for
all stakeholders (creditors, shareholders
and others) are likely to be particularly
traumatic. It will not be straightforward for
a new operator to take over the operations
of a natural resources project, given
IN PRACTICE
In Practice
Biog box
Jamie Logie is head of Sullivan & Cromwell’s EMEA projects practice.
He has 30 years’
experience of international legal practice, all focused on project, asset and other finance
and development work. Email: logiej@sullcrom.com. Chris Howard heads Sullivan &
Cromwell’s European restructuring practice.
A leader in cross-border restructuring and
finance, he advises across a multitude of jurisdictions in Europe, the Middle East and the
Americas. Email: howardcj@sullcrom.com
above assumes that the relevant commodity/
product prices are not in permanent decline,
and there may therefore be significant
upside value in the project in an improving
commodity price environment. This
may result in shareholders (institutional,
specialist funds or others) subscribing for
a rights issue, either to fully deliver the
project, or at least to bring the debt structure
to a sustainable level.
Shorter term funding to bridge the
period before a sale or market pick-up may
be available through factoring/receivables
discounting facilities, which are often
permitted under suitably flexible debt
incurrence covenants in project finance
terms.
Other potential short and longer
term funding options may exist:
specialist infrastructure funds, suppliers/
‘...
lenders potentially acting as shadow directors
will, like the sponsor’s directors, run the risk of
undertaking wrongful trading by the business’
location, technical, market, environmental
and other risks, at least without extensive
diligence.
POTENTIAL BUYERS, NEW EQUITY
AND STRATEGIC INVESTORS
If there is a prospect of sale of the project
to a third party buyer, particularly one
that may commit to repay project debt or
ensure significant deleveraging, lenders are
of course likely to put significant pressure
on the sponsor to pursue this option.
This will introduce one or more third
parties to the restructuring process, with
implications both for timing and deal terms
(for example, introduction of conditions
regarding deleveraging/debt repayment
that are deemed to be acceptable to
lenders). If the sponsor is a public company,
this may require occasional consultation
with the relevant takeover panel or other
financial regulatory body, particularly if
restructuring terms could impact the terms
of the proposed offer.
Of course, much of the process described
buyers (perhaps by way of forward sale
arrangements for products) and other
strategic investors and offtakers may be
considered. Ultimately, bearing in mind the
somewhat illiquid nature of a businesses
of this kind and the imperative to keep
operations going to salvage value for investors
and creditors and to avoid a total write-off of
their indebtedness, certain existing project
lenders may be willing to consider making
new money funding available to the project,
probably at ‘super senior’ level of priority
compared to existing debt and almost
certainly on more restrictive terms than
applied to the original project financing.
CONCLUSION
Although the range of issues relevant
to any restructuring may apply to a
distressed natural resources project, our
experience has repeatedly shown that the
various features highlighted above make it
a different proposition that presents certain
unusual, and sometimes unique, challenges.
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April 2016
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