Cartel leniency programs: Caveats and Costs - November 2015

Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton

Description

SYMPOSIUM : LENIENCY Cartel leniency programs: Caveats and Costs - - - 25 Leah Nylen, One in Three Leniency Applicants Drop Their Marker, DOJ Official Says, MLex (June 7, 2012, 5:00 PM), http://www.mlex.com/ US/Content.aspx?ID=245815. The gap between the number of leniency applications and prosecutions is not limited to the United States, where the criminal prosecution of companies and individuals might provide a greater incentive for marker filings. Data from other jurisdictions show that many companies apply for leniency for conduct in markets where no one is ultimately prosecuted. For example, in 2014 the JFTC reported 50 leniency applications but only 12 cartel decisions; in 2013 the agency reported 102 leniency applications but only 14 cartel decisions.

Rating Enforcement 2015: Japan’s Fair Trade Commission, Global Competition Review (June 16, 2015), available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/surveys/article/38861/japans-fair-trade-commission; Rating Enforcement 2014: Japan’s Fair Trade Commission, Global Competition Review (May 29, 2014), available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/surveys/ article/36069/japans-fair-trade-commission. Even after accounting for the possible lag between a leniency application and an enforcement action, this suggests that a large majority of leniency applications never result in prosecution. COMPETITION LAW & POLICY DEBATE | VOLUME 1 | ISSUE 4 | NOVEMBER 2015 33 .