IV. Conclusion Realizing the potential benefits of PPPs for taxpayers — including lower costs, better service quality and faster project delivery — depends on allocating project risks to the party best able to manage them. Arguably, demand risk is the most important source of uncertainty affecting the financial viability of an infrastructure project in which user volume determines the private partner’s compensation, particularly in the case of new build, or “greenfield” projects, for which no history of use exists. We introduce three incentive structures for PPP contracts that may benefit both public sector sponsors, by creating value for taxpayers, and private investors, by generating attractive returns. Applying principles from the regulation of privately-owned energy and telecom infrastructure to PPP projects in which the private partner assumes temporary control of the infrastructure, the proposed approaches are designed to broaden the scope for PPP negotiations that voluntarily incorporate some of these features into PPP contracts. This process can help to create options attractive to investors and sponsors with risk preferences and return expectations not accommodated by more commonly used models. By aligning investor and sponsor interests, these incentive structures have the potential to increase the number of PPP deals and increase the odds of the projects’ long-term success. 27 .